

**UNCLASSIFIED**

30 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65), for Quarterly  
Period Ending 30 April 1967

Added responsibility was delegated when security control of Valley "G" was designated to the battalion after relocating from Valley "A". As sub-sector commander for security matters, with four additional companies located in the valley under its jurisdiction, the intelligence section prepared and distributed a detailed sub-sector defense OFLAN to all units concerned.

c. During the Vietnamese Holiday Tet in February, and continuing into March, Qui Nhon Support Command directed the battalion to administer a daily levy for a greatly increased guard commitment at the Phu Tai Ammo Supply Point. Extreme difficulties were encountered by the Intelligence Section in coordinating with units in other chains of command when it was necessary to place levees on them for guard purposes. Such heavy commitments, in some cases, forced many of the units to stop normal support functions. It was at this time that the matter was resolved by the formation of a provisional guard company from the 1st Logistical Command assets only. The extra guards and later the provisional company were used to provide increased security at the Valley "F" Ammo Supply Point. When released from this heavy guard commitment, the battalion was able to redirect all its work force once again to construction projects.

d. The only incident threatening the security of the area during the reporting period was the landing of 26 empty 155mm illumination round canisters in the cantonment area of the 19th Engineer Battalion. Four injuries, none serious, resulted from the incident. The rounds had been fired to illuminate the area near a QM laundry about a mile away which had been the victim of a sabotage incident. Coordination was made with the artillery unit to prevent future incidents of this type.

#### 4. Plans, Operations and Training.

a. During this quarter, elements of the battalion spent 6 days in training, 83 days in rear area construction, 48 days in combat support operations, and 4 days in movement of the battalion to the new location.

b. Training was conducted from 0900 hours to 1200 hours every Sunday. Combatives essential to combat engineers such as mine detection, weapons familiarization and booby traps, were conducted along with mandatory training during these hours.

c. Rear area construction included the completion of four projects, the assignment of two new projects and the continuation of three long term construction projects.

d. Completed during the period were the following:

(1) Construction of a CH 47 Heliport Facility located at Lane Army Airfield 12 miles west of Qui Nhon (See inclosure 3). Commencing on 2 February 1967, "C" Company cleared twenty-six acres of land covered with brush and a sandy silt topsoil. After removing a total of 880 cubic yards of this brush

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## 4. Intelligence:

a. The requirement during the initial period of the quarter, directed through the security chain of command from the Qui Nhon Support Command, to increase the guard at the Phu Tai Ammunition Supply Point placed a serious handicap on all units, particularly those not under the Qui Nhon Support Command. As sub-area commander, a great deal of friction and difficulty developed as adjacent units were levied for large personnel commitments for both day and night. Since many units were stripped of personnel, assigned missions in some instances were extremely curtailed, if not ceased. The requirement, which continued for approximately one month, was solved when a provisional guard was formed from the Support Command's own assets. It is felt that the implementation of the provisional guard initially as the security element would have proven much more satisfactory. This would permit units under other command channels to have continued assigned construction projects and support missions without a draw down on capability.

b. On 12 April, during the bombardment of the battalion area, twenty-six each 155 mm illumination canisters, each weighing over 50 pounds, fell in the cantonment area. Little defense could have been provided against the projectiles which in most cases fell with sufficient impact to become buried under four feet of soil. The gravity of the situation can not be over emphasized since it is circumstantial that only four personnel were injured. It is advised that in all cases unit commanders notify artillery units of exact location of all units, and obtain and keep on hand the telephone number, radio frequency and call sign of the support artillery. In the particular incident cited, the battery was assigned to the Tiger Division of the Republic of Korea Army, in which case contact was difficult. All possible coordination should be made in advance to prevent such incidents.

## 5. Logistics:


None

## 5. Equipment and Maintenance:

With augmentation of fifteen items of engineer equipment this period, problems have developed in the maintenance of the equipment. The Prescribed Load List does not allow the maintenance section to stock repair parts. As a result, in order to repair the equipment, the battalion must constantly seek the necessary parts elsewhere. Authorization for a Direct Support Unit to repair, or authorization of a Prescribed Load List, should accompany each item of non-IC & E equipment.

## 4. Incl

1. Command & Control Diagram.
2. Overlay of new 19th Engr Bn Cantonment Area.
3. CH-47 Heliport Facility.
4. Van Canh Airfield.

  
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